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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the evolution of narratives on the Westphalian Treaties (1648) from
nationalist German historiography in the nineteenth and early twentieth century to a political
theory in the mid-twentieth century. Juxtaposing the narratives popularized by German Historians
such as Karl Woltmann, Leopold von Ranke, and Heinrich von Treitschke to that of the Political
Scientists Leo Gross and Hans Morgenthau, the Author seeks to explore how, and most
importantly why, the narrative evolved. The paper demonstrates that the author’s personal
experiences and political ideals, as well as contemporary realities are the primary drivers behind
the evolution of a historical narrative, by focusing on shifts in the narrative tone and historical
interpretation of Westphalia. The historical narrative thus resembles a kaleidoscopic image
intertwining the past it seeks to depict with the authors’ realities. It also illustrates that historical
narratives can transform dramatically and quickly once the ideological factors sustaining the
narrative no longer resonate with an audience.
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Introduction
In the late 1990s, as the 350-year anniversary of the Westphalian treaties marking the end
of the Thirty Years Wars approached, a wealth of scholarship discussing the 1648 treaties and their
significance for the modern state system was published, predominantly by political scientists
instead of historians. Contemporary historiography recognizes the settlements of Osnabrück and
Münster’s importance to European, and specifically German history, but does not assign it the
supreme significance political science has.1 The assumption within the latter discipline is that the
Westphalian treaties gave birth to the modern international system by uprooting the old medievalChristian tradition of international affairs, introducing the idea of international law and creating a
society of sovereign nation states.2 Scholars have traced the genealogy of this ‘Westphalian
Mythos’ within political science back to Leo Gross (1903-1990) and Hans Joachim Morgenthau
(1904-1980), two Jewish émigrés from Germany and Austria who wrote seminal works on the
Westphalian Treaties in the United States in the post-war period, specifically on their 300th
anniversary in 1948. Gross and Morgenthau had a profound impact on the conceptualization of
Westphalia for subsequent generations of scholars as their works served as the standard reference
for all discussion of the treaties within the discipline until today.3
Historians such as Sebastian Schmid, Peter Wilson, Andrew Thompson, Joachim Whaley,
Andreas Osiander, and Christoph Link, commenting on this questionable historical depiction of
the Westphalian treaties amongst political scientists, have concluded that this narrative is the

1

Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: Maximilian I to the Peace of Westphalia (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), 3-15.
2
For examples see: Daniel Philpott, “The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations,” World Politics 52, no.
2 (2000): 206-245; Cornel Zwierlein, “Return to Premodern Times? Contemporary Security Studies, the Early Modern
Holy Roman Empire, and Coping with Achronies,” German Studies Review 38, no. 2 (2015): 373-392; Jason Farr,
“The Westphalian Legacy and the Modern Nation State,” International Social Science Review 80, no. 3, (2005): 156159.
3
Sebastian Schmid, “To Order the Minds of Scholars: The Discourse of the Peace of Westphalia in International
Relations Literature,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 3 (2011): 603-610.
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legacy of nineteenth-century German historiography which had presented the Westphalian treaties
as the central event in early modern German history.4 However, this conclusion is to a large extent
an oversimplification of the evolution of the Westphalia story and not without pitfalls. After all,
theorists such as Dominick LaCapra, Mark Curie, and Eric Berlatsky, have argued that all
narratives are the product of contemporary realities and are shaped by political, sociological,
disciplinary, philosophical, and epistemological trends; they seek to make a statement about the
present by invoking a past experience.5 The historical narrative then is a kaleidoscopic image
which uniquely reflects both the past it seeks to depict while it reveals the circumstances of the
author’s present.6 As another scholar, Willie Thompson, pointed out, these contextual forces take
hold of a narrative by guiding the construction of historical perspectives. 7 Beyond determining the
depiction of the past, this process then also shapes the narrative tone and ideological argument that
the narrative seeks to convey. Given the stark socio-historical contrast between the nineteenth and
early twentieth century, when the historical stories on the Westphalian treaties originated in
German historiography, and the immediate post-war period when Leo Gross and Hans Morgenthau
introduced the story to American Political Science, it follows that the narrative evolved in order to
encapsulate the new realities of its authors.

Schmidt, “To Order the Minds of Scholars,” 601-623; Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, 1-5; Peter
Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire: A Thousand Years of Europe’s History (New York: Allen Lane, 2016): 7-9; Andreas
Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” International Organization 55, no. 2,
(2001): 251-287; Christoph Link, “Die Bedeutung des Westfälischen Friedens in der deutschen
Verfassungsentwicklung: Zum 350 Jährigen Jubiläum eines Reichsgrundgesetzes,” Juristen Zeitung vol. 53, no. 1
(1998): 1-9; Andrew Thompson, “After Westphalia: Remodelling a Religious Foreign Policy” in War and Religion
After Westphalia, 1648–1713, ed. David Onnekink (New York: Routledge, 2016), 50-52.
5
Dominick LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1983), 13-18; Mark Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 79-85. Eric
Berlatsky, The Real, the True, and the Told: Postmodern Historical Narrative and the Ethics of Representation
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2011), 3-8, 13-22.
6
LaCapra, Rethinking Intellectual History, 15-20; Berlatsky, The Real, the True, and the Told, 5-10.
7
Willie Thompson, Postmodernism and History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 21-25.
4
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Indeed, the Westphalian Mythos in political science scholarship is not, as was previously
so casually assumed, a mere derivative of its nineteenth- and early twentieth-century predecessor.
While both share in the assumption that the Westphalian Treaties marked the origin of state
sovereignty, comparing nationalist interpretations with those of Gross and Morgenthau will expose
differences in narrative emphasis, highlight omissions, and examine changes in the narrative tone.
By taking into account the lives of Gross and Morgenthau, their socio-political setting, as well as
the disciplinary context within which they constructed their own readings of these events, we are
able to discern why the narrative transformed and why this new perspective was universally
accepted within the field of political science. Ultimately, this study not only illuminates the
multitude of forces that contributed to the evolving nature of the Westphalian Mythos, but by
focusing on the dynamic nature of narratives, it provides a unique insight into the ‘life’ of historical
events and how individual authors can take ownership of and recast past interpretations to fit
present realities.

Origins of the Westphalian Mythos: A Historical Scapegoat for an Apprehensive Nation
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, scholarly understanding of the
Westphalian treaties remained relatively static and was marked by nationalist undertones. The
narrative stipulated that when some two hundred delegates from all over Europe gathered in 1648
in the Westphalian towns of Münster and Osnabrück to negotiate the end of the Thirty Years War,
they supposedly sealed the fate of the Holy Roman Empire which lost its ability to function as a
coherent unit.8 The Emperor’s ambition to establish himself as the universal monarch of
Christendom had been thwarted by the combined efforts of Germany’s Protestant princes, most

8

Heinrich Von Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte im 19ten Jahrhundert (Leipzig: Hirzel Verlag, 1879), 2-25
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notably Frederick V of the Palatinate.9 France and Sweden had joined the war at an opportune time
and were able to force atrocious peace terms on the Empire, debilitating it as a political unit. As a
consequence of his defeat, the Emperor lost his sovereignty over the Empire’s territories; the
position was now only a nominal honour. Instead, the individual territories of the Empire,
regardless of their strength, size, or position within the feudal hierarchy of the Empire, emerged
from the conference as sovereign states and supreme rulers of their territories, on an equal footing
with the Emperor and out of reach of the Pope’s political grasp.10 This development dispersed
political power within the Empire, and from 1648 onwards it merely existed as a debilitated statelike entity unable to defend German interests and unite the nation.11
This narrative emerged out of Germany’s national anxieties in the nineteenth century – and
for Germans there certainly was much to be anxious about.12 On December 2nd, 1805 another
episode in the seemingly endless French-German rivalry ended with a dramatic French victory
when Napoléon smashed the Austrian forces at the battle of Austerlitz. Four weeks later Austria
signed the treaty of Pressburg, and six month later Austrian King and Holy Roman Emperor
Francis II hastily abdicated and dissolved the one-thousand-year-old German Empire – lest
Napoléon snatch the crown.13 It was in this setting, at the pinnacle of French power in Germany,
that Karl Ludwig Woltmann, a Hessian diplomat and historian, published his History of the

9

Karl Woltmann, Geschichte des Westfälischen Friedens in Zwei Theilen Erstes Buch (Leipzig: Georg Joachim
Röschen Verlag, 1809), 5-20.
10
Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'état and Its Place in Modern History (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1957), 134-136. Originally published in 1924 under the title Die Idee der Staatsräson in der
Neueren Geschichte.
11
Franz Joseph Holzwarth, Weltgeschichte Sechster Band: Vom Westfälischen Frieden bis zum Ausbruch der
Französischen Revolution (Mainz: Verlag von Franz Kirchheim, 1886), 2-12.
12
Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire, 3; Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: The Peace of
Westphalia to the Dissolution of the Reich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), xxv-xxvi; James J. Sheehan,
“What is German history? Reflections on the role of the nation in German history and historiography,” The Journal
of Modern History 53, no. 1 (1981): 2-4.
13
Tim Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory, Europe 1648-1815 (New York: Viking, 2007), 652-663.
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Westphalian Treaties in Two Parts (1809). To Woltmann, the misery his fellow countrymen
experienced at the hands of the ‘Little Corporal’ were the immediate result of the Westphalian
treaties. He argued that what began as a German civil war in 1618 turned into a European struggle
when France, under the leadership of the shrewd cardinal Richelieu, and its puppet Sweden,
entered the War under the guise of preserving the liberties of German princes.14 When the warring
parties concluded the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück in 1648, France destroyed the Empire by
playing off its different interest groups against one another, ultimately dividing up sovereignty
amongst the princes.15 To Woltmann, this quasi-confederate structure subsequently allowed
France to meddle in the Empire’s affairs and most importantly prevented it from defending itself
against France’s eastward incursions.16 The implicit argument, that Woltmann’s audience certainly
would not have missed, was that Germany’s current geopolitical quagmire was the immediate
product of France’s doing in 1648.
Woltmann’s politically-charged history of the Westphalian treaties proved to be an
inspiration for subsequent generations of German historians who, like him, needed a historical
scapegoat to account for the perceived shortcomings of their modern nation. Despite Napoléon’s
ultimate fall, the Holy Roman Empire was not restored. In 1848, a wave of liberal-nationalist
uprisings, inspired by the vision of a united-nation state, had taken hold in the many German
kingdoms; however, that liberal-nationalist dream was short-lived as Prussian King Fredrick
Wilhelm IV sullenly rejected the offer to become Emperor of a united ‘small-German’ state ruled
as a constitutional monarchy. 17 In the southern half of ‘great-Germany’, Austrian armies put down

14

Woltmann, Geschichte des Westfälischen Friedens in Zwei Theilen Erstes Buch, 20-32.
Ibid., 342-348. The parallels to Napoléon’s divide-and-conquer strategy are hard to miss; Bonaparte had secured
the support of the German Kingdoms of Bavaria and Würtemberg in the fourth war of the coalitions.
16
Ibid., 120-130.
17
Brendan Simms, Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy. From 1453 to the Present (New York: Penguin Random
House, 2013), 218-220.
15
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the remaining revolutionary groupings and the political status quo ante-bellum prevailed.18 The
failure to produce a powerful nation-state to challenge the hegemony of their neighbours to the
west and east had a profound impact on Germany’s self-perception which had not quite recovered
from Napoléon’s ransacking.19 When Germany eventually unified under Prussian leadership in
1871, many Germans believed it had come too late. Despite its astounding victory over France,
who had an Empire and colonies, Germans were still prone to imperial anxieties.20 Outpaced by
its rivals, the new nation would have to fight to get a “place in the sun”, as Chancellor Bernhard
von Bülow famously phrased it.21 The ensuing decades of military hubris ended in catastrophe
when the Empire confidently began the march to its own demise in the late summer of 1914.
Despite Reichspräsident Friedrich Ebert’s assurances that the German army had remained
‘undefeated’ in 1918, the Treaty of Versailles the following year left little doubt that Germany
had, in fact, been defeated and so Germans fell back into their natural state of unease and anxiety.22
Over the course of this ‘long century’, four generations of Germans cultivated feelings of
weakness and inadequacy, and continually stocked feud with France, the ‘hereditary enemy’.
These ideas were projected onto their reading of the past. Not surprisingly, throughout this ‘long
century’ the Westphalian story remained largely static. From Karl Woltmann’s writings at the
beginning of the 1800s to Friedrich Meinecke’s scholarship in the interwar years, Westphalian
historiography remained highly politicised and constant in its historical perspective, tone, and
ideological message. Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), certainly the most influential Germanlanguage historian of the nineteenth century, and an observer of the failed 1848 rebellions,

18

Ibid., 216-221.
Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2006), 468-509; Simms, Europe, 168-177.
20
Peter Zolling, Deutsche Geschichte von 1871 bis zur Gegenwart: Wie Deutschland Wurde, was Es Ist (München:
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005), 32-38.
21
Ibid., 37-40, 62-64.
22
Clark, Iron Kingdom, 742.
19
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lamented in the fourth volume of his French History of the 16th and 17th Century (1856) that France
had gained a political and a territorial foothold in the Empire in 1648 by taking control of three
bishoprics that remained nominally part of the Empire, thus gaining a vote in the Reichstag in
Regensburg.23 Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), a political activist who had clamoured for
German unification in the 1850s and 1860s, a historian and a member of the National-Liberal
caucus of the Reichstag, went even further. He stipulated in his books, articles, and lectures, that
the settlements of Münster and Osnabrück marked the de-facto end of the Empire as a viable
political institution, since it was the Empire’s princes who now exercised supreme sovereignty
over their territories and since they all too often did France’s bidding in the hope of advancing
their own status.24 Franz Holzwarth (1826-1878), a contemporary of Treitschke, argued in his
World History (1886) that the immediate legacy of the Westphalia treaties was to usher in a period
in which the German princes oriented their policy according to their own raison d’état instead of
considering the greater interest of the pan-German nation.25 This point had a defining impact on
Treitschke’s student Friedrich Meinecke (1862-1954), who reiterated that very in point in
conjunction with his hypothesis that France post-1648 was able to maintain a fractured German
nation that could not pose a threat to its own ambitions by appealing to the princes’ selfish
interests.26 The ultimate legacy of the treaties was thus the oppression of the German cause and
the failure of Germany to unite and take its place amongst the world’s great states.
The sullen historical perspective these scholars had of the Westphalian treaties and the
ultimate legacy of these settlements was only amplified by their narrative tone. Nationalist writers,

23

Leopold von Ranke, Französische Geschichte, vornehmlich im 16 und 17 Jahrhundert vierter Band (Stuttgart:
Gottascher Verlag: 1856), 441-442.
24
Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte im 19ten Jahrhundert, 2-16; Heinrich von Treitschke, Politik – Vorlesungen
gehalten an der Universität zu Berlin (Leipzig: Verlag von G. Hirzel, 1900), 525-528.
25
Holzwarth, Weltgeschichte, 2-8.
26
Meinecke, Machiavellism, 134-136.
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even when attempting to speak with an objective voice, certainly did not hide their passionate
discontent. The legacy of 1648 and the political status post-bellum was likened by Ranke as the
“rape” [Vergewaltigung] of Germany, now unable to fend off intrusions from its southern, eastern,
or western borders.27 The devolution of power, prompting an increased rivalry amongst German
princes was described by Holzwarth as nothing short of an “anti-Christian conspiracy”
[Antichrsitliche Verschwörung].28 To Treitschke, 1648 marked the “doomsday of traditional
German culture” [Untergang der alten deutschen Kultur], which left the Empire, now composed
of a “rotten imperial core and crude territories” [Durcheinander verotteter Reichsformen und
unfertiger Territorien], “in shambles” [Trümmerstücke].29 Meinecke stressed the disruptive aspect
of the Westphalian treaties on the Empire’s internal structure. He bewailed the princes who
“plundered the monarchical rights of the imperial power, only in order to take them for
themselves,” rather than help consolidate the nation into a powerful political unit.30 The dramatic
language that characterizes these nationalist writings creates a narrative in which the audience
cannot but feel sympathetic towards the German nation, first wronged by the Emperor and
subsequently taken advantage of by its neighbours. The combination of the emotionally-charged
language and the politically-motivated historical perspective turned this nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century reading of the Westphalia story into an ideological narrative aimed at stirring up
sentiments demanding retribution.
While to earlier generations, like Woltmann and Ranke, the story of Westphalia functioned
as a collective call to action, later generations added a redemptive dimension to the story. They
argued that French villainy was not powerful enough to suppress the German nation for eternity.

27

Ranke, Französische Geschichte, 462.
Holzwarth, Weltgeschichte, 2.
29
Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte im 19ten Jahrhundert, 6-7.
30
Meinecke, Machiavellism, 135.
28
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The Kingdom of Prussia emerged as the defender of the oppressed, rallied the nation, and
completed what should have been completed in the seventeenth century; it created a German
nation-state that could rival and even surpass its ‘hereditary enemy’.31 This narrative of Westphalia
is a drama with villains and heroes, oppressors and tyrants, which begins with the historic low of
Germany in 1648 and ends with the redemption of the defeated and the righting of a historic wrong
in 1871, with the Franco-Prussian war and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine.32 It is particularly
this mindset that caused the German historian Heinrich von Sybel (1817-1895) to emphasise the
defining impact the Westphalian treaties had on Franco-German relations over the past centuries
in his book The Peace of 1871, published immediately after the Franco-Prussian war that same
year.33 In the 1920s and early 1930s, after Germans felt they had been again been cheated and
humiliated by France, this time with the assistance of Great Britain and the United States, it was
these stories of injustice, persecution, and excessive nationalism that helped propel nationalsocialism to power.34 Still in the 1940s Hitler furiously proclaimed that “it is not the Treaty of
Versailles we must destroy, but the Treaty of Westphalia”.35

The Westphalian Myth After the Second World War
Following the Second World War, the Westphalia story all but disappeared in German
historiography, as scholars abandoned the nationalist and politically-charged narrative of the
previous century.36 However, the German émigré scholars Leo Gross and Hans Morgenthau,

The ‘phoenix from the ashes’ element is part of the narratives on Westphalia. The best example is Treitschke’s
introduction to Deutsche Geschichte. This has also been pointed out by Whaley and Wilson.
32
Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte im 19ten Jahrhundert, 2-103. The chapter begins with the immediate aftermath of
1648 and concludes with Prussia’s rise in the eighteenth century, foreshadowing the upcoming unification.
33
Heinrich von Sybel, Der Friede von 1871 (Düsseldorf: Verlagshandlung von Julius Buddeus, 1871), 41, 78.
34
Bernhard Giesen, Intellectuals and the Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 64.
35
Hugh Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler's Table Talk 1941-1944: Secret Conversations (New York: Enigma Books, 2013),
501.
36
Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire, 683-685; Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, 2-9.
31
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writing in the United States for an audience not wholly familiar with German historiography on
the treaties, continued to write on 1648. The writings of both scholars reasserted the claim made
by previous German historians that Westphalia yielded a system of sovereign nation-states, leading
current historians to conclude that these scholars merely continued the traditional narrative.
However, this similarity in the historical framework does not by itself constitute a narrative
continuum. After all, a historical tale, like all stories, has a narrative arch, a tone of voice, moral
lessons for its audience, and several ideological undertones. All of these literary aspects are not
only detached from the historical framework an author depicts, but also contingent on their
experiences and ideological stance.
Leo Gross’ article “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948” was published in 1948 in the
widely-read American Journal of International Law, and subsequently served as the preface to his
collection of essays titled Essays on International Law and Organization (1983), thus securing
maximum readership.37 The same year Gross presented his interpretation on the lasting political
legacy of Westphalia, Hans Morgenthau published the first edition of his magnum opus Politics
Amongst Nations. While primarily dedicated to understanding current political problems, the
Westphalian treaties featured prominently in Morgenthau’s text. Both maintain the same historical
framework of the previous narrative, while departing from past interpretations on historical
perspective, narrative tone, and ideological undertones, thus indicating a general transformation in
the conceptualization of the 1648 peace treaties.
Leo Gross’ history of the Westphalian treaties at first follows a familiar script. The treaties
signed by the delegates in Münster and Osnabrück marked a watershed moment in the history of
international relations; 1648 was the “majestic portal which leads from the old into the new

Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948,” American Journal of International Law. 42, No. 1 (1948): 2040; Leo Gross, Essays on international law and organization. (New York: Springer, 2014), 3-23.
37
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world”.38 Westphalia ushered in political modernity as it broke the supremacy of the Emperor by
endowing the Empire’s Princes with total sovereign authority over their territory. 39 In his
subsequent analysis of the significance of these treaties, Gross marked a sharp departure from
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century writings. Gone is the emphasis on the Empire. Instead,
Gross explained that the settlements had far-reaching consequences for the nature of foreign affairs
in all of Europe, transforming the entire international system; a point he reiterated in other essays
as well.40 For the past three centuries, the world of foreign policy had been governed by principles
articulated at Münster and Osnabrück; notions of individual state sovereignty, peace through
balance of power, as well as equality and equity amongst states, all could be traced back to 1648. 41
Elaborating on the legacy of the treaties, Gross, a jurist by training, argued that the Westphalian
agreements were primarily legal documents. Its creators, he continued, were not ill-intentioned
French politicians, but intellectuals well-versed in the political philosophy of Grotius, Suarez, and
Victoria, who had designed these treaties with the intent of building a framework of international
relations.42 Placed within their historical context, Gross maintained, the treaties did not merely
mark the sudden death of the Empire, but merely legitimized a political reality that had been
created 150 years prior, following the Protestant Reformation. The tone with which he engaged
with his subject is one of cautious benevolence and genuine optimism; his writings certainly do
not bare the frustrated and embittered tone of Ranke, Holzwarth, or Treitschke.43 Similarly, the
underlying ideological message is not a call to arms for a national uprising to undo a historic
wrong, but rather a plea for peace. Gross argued that 1648 marked the beginning of the formation
Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948,”, 28.
Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948”, 27-29.
40
Ibid., 20-23; Gross, Essays on International Law and Organization, 184.
41
Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948,” 26, 29-31.
42
Ibid., 38-40.
43
Comparing Ranke’s Französische Geschichte, Holwarth’s Weltgeschichte, and Treitschke’s Deutsche Geschichte
to Gross‘ or Morgenthau’s writings exposes the drastic change in narrative voice.
38
39
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of a rules-based international order, a status to which the world should return to and strive to
maintain in the aftermath of the Second World War by acknowledging state sovereignty and
adhering to the principles of international relations.44
Hans Morgenthau, unlike Gross, did not write any major texts examining exclusively the
Westphalian treaties. Rather he used the 1648 settlements as a historical starting point from which
he developed his history of international relations. 45 His discourse on the treaties must therefore
be viewed within the broader intellectual context of his other writings and political philosophy.
Morgenthau was primarily a political theorist, interested in analysing and making foreign policy.
Morgenthau’s historical perspective on the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück resembles Gross’.
In several of his works he asserted that, by ending the era of religious wars, the Westphalian treaties
had “[laid] down the rights and duties of states in relations to each other”.46 This new relationship
between nation states was one of sovereign equality, and as a result had brought peace and stability
to a war-torn Europe.47 Morgenthau claimed that these new “rules of the game”, which the treaties
of Osnabrück and Münster had enshrined, had governed international relations ever since.48
Consequently, all history of international relations since 1648 could and should be understood
through the philosophical principles established at Westphalia. In contrast to the writings of the
previous century, Morgenthau’s voice is not dramatic or filled with a sense of urgency. For
example, the Empire is not described as ‘rotten’ or ‘monstrous’, neither is it likened to a raped
individual who would have fallen victim to the Anti-Christ.49 Instead his tone is very matter-offactual while his language is descriptive instead of metaphorical. Similar to Gross, the lesson
Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948,” 20-22.
Schmidt, “To Order the Minds of Scholars,” 606.
46
Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (New York, Alfred Kopf,
1948), 210. A point he reiterated in Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 191.
47
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 150.
48
Ibid., 139.
49
These were the metaphors respectively used by Treitschke, Ranke, and Holzwarth; See above n. 32 and 33.
44
45

12

Morgenthau’s narrative imparts on his audience is a cautious warning against emotions and
ideological fervour. In his view, understanding the implications of the Westphalian treaties allows
scholars to understand contemporary international relations on a global scale and to map out a
clear path going forward by applying the historical lessons learned. Morgenthau’s story promotes
peace, stability, and the maintenance of the political status quo; a stark contrast to the message
conveyed by nineteenth-century versions of the mythos.
The two Westphalian tales are connected to the extent that they shared a factual framework
and that their authors ultimately used the past to make a statement about the present. However, the
aforementioned shift in historical perspective and interpretation, the discrepancies in narrative tone
indicating a changing relationship between author and subject, and the vastly different ideological
motivations that drive the historical story, suggest a fundamental transformation of the
Westphalian mythos from a tale propagating nationalist sentiments to a political theory. Given the
rather static nature of the narrative prior to Gross and Morgenthau’s mid twentieth-century
scholarship, why these two authors departed from the previous academic consensus begs further
investigation. There are a range of factors that usually impact narrative developments; the
production of new interpretative knowledge, a new historiographical trend, or the discovery of
new documents or other primary sources. Yet, neither Gross nor Morgenthau claimed to present
ground-breaking new research. However, the historical, political, ideological, and academic
circumstances in which these scholars created their narratives had a profound and decisive impact
on the interpretation of the past. Therefore, examining the context within which this new
Westphalian mythos was written, as well as the lives of Gross and Morgenthau, allows us to make
sense of what prompted this narrative shift and account for such changes in perspective, tone, and
ideology.

13

Leo Gross, Hans Morgenthau, and the Year 1948
Leo Gross was born into a petit-bourgeois secular Jewish family in 1903, in the small
Austro-Hungarian township of Krosno located in the Empire’s eastern most province of Galicia,
modern day Poland.50 He studied politics, law, and economics in Vienna in the 1920s and finished
a doctoral dissertation titled Pacifism and Imperialism in 1927 under the supervision of Hans
Kelsen (1881-1973), Austria’s leading legal scholar.51 Kelsen, had achieved considerable fame in
1920 when he was tasked by the Austrian Chancellor Karl Renner to write the young republic’s
Constitution. Furthermore, he was the leading figure in the Vienna School of Law, an intellectual
tradition that championed legal positivism, which argued that laws were created by humankind
rather than dictated by universal morality.52 Gross followed his mentor’s lead, embracing a similar
approach and mindset which would subsequently shape his understanding of the past.53 In the late
1920s and early 1930s he travelled to the United States and Great Britain where he studied first at
Harvard and then at the London School of Economics, before returning to the continent where he
took up a professorship in ‘Public Law, Political Science, and Legal Philosophy’ [“öffentliches
Recht, Allgemeine Staatslehre, und Rechtsphilosophie”] at the University of Cologne in 1932. 54
However, Gross’ time in Germany was short-lived. Following the National-Socialist Party’s rise
to power in 1933, he was dismissed from his position on account of his Jewish ancestry. 55 He
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hoped to be able to secure a teaching position at his alma mater in London, but to no avail. He
subsequently moved to Paris where he worked for the International Institute of Intellectual
Cooperation, a think-tank associated with the League of Nations.56 Gross still lived in France when
Germany invaded in the spring of 1940, forcing him again to flee. This time not to Britain, but to
the United States via Vichy France, fascist Spain, and fascist Portugal.57
Fortunately for Gross, his reputation as a scholar preceded him and by 1941 he had secured
a position at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, in Massachusetts,
teaching international relations and international law. He stayed at Tufts for the remainder of his
academic career, though he toured several Ivy League universities as a visiting professor and gave
lectures in both Japan and Europe.58 Throughout his career in the United States, Gross wrote on
international law, its history, and its application in a Cold War context through multi-state
institutions like the United Nations. Significantly, his emphasis lay on the implementation of
international law in a system of sovereign states that were not themselves subject to a higher
authority, a fact that dismayed Gross. 59 As a proponent of legal positivism, Gross did not believe
that states were bound by a series of moral laws. International laws aimed at governing interstate
relations were only effective to the degree that they were made and enforced by men. His writings
on international law were thus intimately connected to his conceptualization of the international
system itself, and the factors that determined the actions of states. Although Gross occasionally
advised the US State Department on policy issues, he remained primarily an academic. He passed
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away in 1990 having published a wealth of articles, essays, and books that served as the foundation
for US political thought for decades.60
Hans Morgenthau was born in 1904 into a Jewish middle-class family in the small Bavarian
town of Coburg. In the 1920s he studied philosophy and international law in Munich, Berlin, and
Frankfurt am Main where he published his dissertation titled International Jurisdiction: Its Nature
and its Limits [Die Internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen] in 1929.61
Morgenthau’s post-doctoral period in Frankfurt was short-lived. Anticipating the Nazi rise to
power, he left for Geneva in 1932 where he stayed until 1935.62 While there, he worked at the
Institute of International Studies alongside Gross’ mentor Hans Kelsen, who was to have a
profound impact in shaping his views on the international system. 63 Following a brief stay in
Madrid, where he worked at the Instituto de Estudios Internationales y Económicos, a position that
had first been offered to Leo Gross, Morgenthau left for New York City in 1937.64 In the 1930s
and 1940s he taught courses on a range of topics from history to law to political science, first on
an occasional basis at Brooklyn College, then permanently at the University of Missouri-Kansas
City, where he lectured for the duration of the Second World War.65 1946 marked the year of
Morgenthau’s breakthrough. The University of Chicago offered him a full-time position as well as
the academic platform to reach a wide and influential audience.66
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Morgenthau’s previous education and lecturing experience had focused on international
law. At Chicago, he shifted his attention to political science more broadly and the imminent
dangers of armed conflict. He embarked on a series of guest lectures at Ivy League universities
where he taught and mentored the future Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and made a profound
impression on the State Department’s Director of Policy Planning, George F. Kennan, who made
Morgenthau a consultant for the Department. In 1950 he founded the Center for the Study of
American Foreign and Military Policy in Chicago, indicating his shift from legal scholarship to
international affairs.67 During the 1950s Morgenthau was mostly active as a scholar, but returned
to policy making as an advisor to President Kennedy and President Johnson.68 His profound antiVietnam war stance ultimately lead to his dismissal from the Johnson administration in 1965 and
a clash with his former student Henry Kissinger in the early 1970s. 69 Over the course of his career,
Morgenthau published several influential works, most prominently Politics Amongst Nations
(1948), which examined the nature of states, humanity, war, and the international system. His
writings were not without controversy. Morgenthau was not convinced that it was in America’s
interest to promote democracy and internationalism through coercive means, an opinion that was
not shared by many of his contemporaries.70 He passed away in 1980 having established himself
as one of the most significant figures and influential writers in his discipline.
Leo Gross and Hans Morgenthau came from similar socio-economic backgrounds, were
raised within the same culture, both studied international relations with an emphasis on
international law and shared the same mentor, gravitated to the same circles, and ultimately shared
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a similar traumatic experience of having to flee their homelands because of their religious origins.
It was these similarities that ultimately created a shared understanding of politics and shaped the
way both authors engaged with and depicted the past. Once they had gained a foothold in the
United States, their writings on interstate relations reflected the need to account for and make sense
of the new world order that emerged out of the ashes of the Second World War. Both published
their seminal essays in 1948 which laid the foundations of the Westphalia myth in political science.
The year, and those leading up to it, had been politically turbulent and fairly eventful. In Central
and Eastern Europe borders were redrawn, Germany had been partitioned by the Allied powers
and was now the stage for US-Soviet political power plays. 71 In 1948, the reluctance of Arab states
to recognize the newly-founded state of Israel resulted in the first of many Arab-Israeli wars that
completely destabilized the Middle East; this was particularly troubling to Gross and Morgenthau
who felt connected to the Jewish state.72 Meanwhile, France and Great Britain were struggling to
come to terms with their new status as second-rate powers. India, the jewel in the British Imperial
crown, achieved independence in 1947, while France was struggling to re-take control of its
colonial Empire, large parts of which had fallen to the Axis powers during the war; the suppression
of uprisings in Madagascar, Indochina, Algeria, and Vietnam was only partially successful.73 The
Cold War gradually intensified as the United States and the Soviet Union aimed to exert influence
in Europe, the former through economic aid and the latter through starvation and tanks. 74 Clearly,
the period of the immediate post-war is most fittingly described as dynamic, not to say chaotic,
and, to a large degree, volatile, fickle, and unpredictable. The newly formed United Nations sought
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to establish a new political framework just as the structure of the previous world order came
crashing down. Founded only month after the end of the Second World War in the fall of 1945, it
succeeded the unsuccessful League of Nations and represented the second attempt to create an
international order on the basis of liberal internationalism.75 Gross’ and Morgenthau’s writings
were thus responding to a world that had witnessed rapid, massive political change and which was
now attempting to create a new international framework while teetering on the brink of a third
world war. Therefore, Gross’ and Morgenthau’s thought during those crucial and tumultuous years
was shaped and guided by their desire to understand how to bring peace back to the world of
politics after a major conflict and how to sustain this world order in the ensuing period of
instability.
Gross’ and Morgenthau’s writings constitute a response to the political developments
around them, while their personal experiences influenced their perception and attitudes towards
contemporary events, and ultimately shaped their interpretation of the past. However, biography
and political settings are just two of the many ‘mirrors and lenses’ in the kaleidoscope of
historiographical creation.76 To understand the narrative evolution of the Westphalia story more
completely, the contextual impact of disciplinary developments must also be considered.
Specifically, the emergence of the Realist school of international relations in North American
academia, to which both Gross and Morgenthau adhered, as well as the theoretical turn within the
political science discipline more broadly, had a profound impact on their writings and thus their
understanding, interpretation, and representation of the past.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, political science had not stood out amongst
the premiere social sciences at European universities. It was attached to the study of history,
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philosophy, or economics as an ancillary discipline.77 This was very different in the United States
where political science had gradually gained prominence since the turn of the twentieth century.78
Appalled by European imperialist politics of and its “Machiavellian” tactics, American scholars
constructed an alternative conceptualization of international relations based on the writings of
enlightened thinkers such as Emmanuel Kant, John Locke, and Adam Smith. Liberalism, as this
popular theory came to be called, borrowed from liberal economic theory which stipulated that
world peace could be achieved through economic interdependence, collective security, and the
spread of democracy and democratic values.79 British economist John Maynard Keynes and US
President Woodrow Wilson counted amongst its biggest champions.80 Following World War I, an
attempt was made to implement a Liberal framework of international relations through the creation
of the League of Nations, whose shortcomings and failures were amply demonstrated by the
outbreak of the Second World War.81
In the immediate post-war period, a small group of political thinkers, which included
Gross, Morgenthau, as well as other émigré scholars such as Herman Kahn (1922-1983) or the
future US National Security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928-2017), developed a new theory of
international relations called Realism.82 This theory drew on some of the principles articulated in
the writings of seventeenth-century political philosophers Samuel von Pufendorf and Thomas
Hobbes and was marked by a fundamental pessimism about the international system. Realist
theory stipulated that states existed within an anarchical realm in which each one was inherently
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self-interested and inherently mistrusting of the other. Such a system was in a state of constant
crisis and teetering on imminent collapse.83 Stability was maintained through a carefully-calibrated
balance of power, acknowledgment of the total sovereignty of other states, a foreign policy based
on empirical reasoning rather than ideological notions of what ought to be, and military
proliferation. Twentieth-century Realism acknowledged the role of international institutions but
remained wary of their ability to provide a permanent structure to an innately anarchical system.84
The emergence of this theory, diametrically opposed to the established Liberal school of thought,
created a schism amongst political scientists. This process influenced the evolution of the
Westphalian story, as Gross and Morgenthau ultimately used the past to illustrate the innate truisms
articulated in modern Realist theory.
By the end of the Second World War, political science was no longer confined to the ivory
tower of academia but stood in the public spotlight. Professors of political science wrote
commissioned reports and studies for the United Nations and the State Department and enjoyed
moments of public fame. For example, Henry Kissinger, then a Professor of Government at
Harvard, was interviewed on live television by celebrity game show host Mike Wallace. 85 The
sudden rise of political science was largely fuelled by what the discipline claimed to offer: a
scientific method that could predict the behaviour of states in the international system. However,
migration patterns also contributed to the sudden prominence of the discipline. Felix Rösch has
convincingly argued that it was no coincidence that a political science school dedicated to interstate relations emerged at the same time a whole wave of scholars from Europe, particularly of
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German-Jewish descent, fled to the United States.86 While political science as a general discipline
had not been of interest to European scholars, there existed a rich tradition of studying inter-state
relations from a historical or legal point of view.87 ‘Realpolitik’, the traditional German school of
international relations, thus had a profound impact on the development of the discipline in the
United States from both an ideological and methodological standpoint, and arguably provided the
framework for Realism. The writings of international relations theorists like Gross and
Morgenthau thus mark an attempt to bridge this gap and to reconcile and combine the German
legal and historical tradition while embracing the empirical turn prominent in the United States.
They attempted to both marry their previous understanding of international relations with the new
political realities of the Cold War and situate their writings within the broader general political
science discipline; they had, to quote one of Morgenthau’s biographers, “to wrap [their] distinctly
German theory in new clothing”.88
The migration of international relations theory from Europe to the United states was
accompanied by a shifting trend in methodological inquiry. The turn away from historical casestudies towards structuralism placed an enormous emphasis on abstraction, philosophy, and
theoretical models, while the analysis of the role of individual actors was sidelined.89 The
theorization of the social sciences had already begun in nineteenth-century Europe, with British
historian John Seeley’s 1896 collected historico-political studies, Introduction to Political Science,
or German sociologist Max Weber’s 1905 The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of
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Capitalism.90 However, while these works were still in-depth historical studies of the past,
American theorists were less historically-minded. Throughout the early twentieth century,
American political scientists adapted this approach and began to undertake an empirical turn within
their discipline. By the midway point of the century, this scientific approach to studying politics
and international relations dominated the discipline.91 The disciplinary balancing act that Gross
and Morgenthau had to perform was thus accompanied by a methodological split as well.

Tracking the Evolution of the Westphalian Myth
Narratives evolve, much like living species in nature, very gradually and slowly. Much like
a wolf did not turn into a dog overnight, so the Westphalian Myth did not immediately abandon
all its forgone conclusions about ‘what happened’ in 1648. The core historical argument, that the
treaties of Münster and Osnabrück created a system of sovereign states, was articulated by
nineteenth-century historians and maintained by Gross and Morgenthau. Nonetheless, key portions
of the narrative have changed. While some “evolutionary traits” are overt, some are more subtle
and implicit. However, all make a profound impact on the ‘life’ of the historical story as they not
only provide the reader with a profoundly different sense of the past, but also impart a new moral
lesson. Most significantly, they shift the scope of the historical inquiry into the Westphalian
treaties providing an alternative sense of the ultimate impact of 1648. Similarly, the root causes of
the Thirty Years War are framed quite differently, altering the reader’s understanding of the war
and the role of the treaties in shaping the post-war world. Consequently, the supposed purpose and
intent of the Westphalia treaties also differs in both narratives, conveying to their respective
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audiences a varying understanding of their importance and a fundamentally different perception
of the Westphalian settlements within the framework of the early modern period in general.
Thematically, these changes can be categorized into three separate but interconnected
transformations: a shift in the historical perspective from which the authors engage the past, a
variation in the narrative voice and language used by the authors to frame the story in a certain
moral and ideological light, and a change in the argument and lesson the myth imparts on its
audience. Contextual realities determine how authors engage with the past, yet the stories also
reflect how authors attempt to respond to and shape the world around them by invoking and
drawing upon history.
When the Thirty Years War drew to an end, it had drawn almost a thousand fractions into
the war, accounting for all the Empire’s principalities. It was a pan-European war fought at the
heart of the continent.92 Examining the geographical scope of the peace treaties that ended the war,
nineteenth-century historians confined their narrative to the Holy Roman Empire. The Westphalian
settlements are depicted as changing the political make-up of the Empire and shifting the balance
of power in Europe in favour of France, but not as having any systemic impact beyond its borders.
While Treitschke commented that the treaties marked a ‘first’ grand international treaty, a point
later on restated by Meinecke, he maintained that the prime function of the peace was to debilitate
the Holy Roman Empire.93 This historiography thus cast 1648 as a German event within the greater
‘epic’ of the seemingly perpetual Franco-German rivalry, silencing the role of other European
actors and neglecting the continental-wide dimension of the conflict. Gross and Morgenthau’s
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narrative had a decidedly more cosmopolitan dimension, yet like its predecessor it paid little
attention to the role of smaller actors.
For Gross and Morgenthau, the Westphalian treaties had implications beyond merely
changing the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire; they fundamentally and permanently
reshaped the system of relations between states. To Gross, Westphalia was “the first great
European or world charter” creating “world unity on the basis of states exercising untrammelled
sovereignty over certain territories and subordinated to no earthly authorities”.94 Westphalia thus
laid the foundation “of an international society embracing, on a footing of equality, the entire
human race irrespective of religion and from of government”.95 Westphalia, however, was not yet
the finished product. “The Hague Peace Conferences, the League of Nations, and we may
confidently assert, the United Nations are further stages in this development” for a stable
international system, thus establishing a clear and direct link between the present and seventeenthcentury Europe.96 Morgenthau provided a similar reading on the geographical scope of the
settlements of Münster and Osnabrück. “From 1648 to the French Revolution of 1789 the Princes
and their advisers took the moral and political unity of Europe for granted”. This “awareness of an
intellectual and moral unity upon whose foundations the balance of power reposes and which
makes its beneficial operations possible was the common possession […] of that age”.97 This
global balance of power first created in 1648 yielded an international system of actors “each of
whom accepted the reason of state, that is, the rational pursuit, with certain moral limitations, of
the power objectives of the individual state, as the ultimate standard of international behaviour”.98
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Gross and Morgenthau’s history of Westphalia is decidedly international in scope; the concrete
effects on the domestic structure of the Holy Roman Empire are entirely omitted in both of their
accounts. 1648, previously a cornerstone of German history, had now evolved into a story of
utmost importance to the history of international relations. By internationalizing the narrative,
Gross and Morgenthau were able to effectively silence the nationalist connotations that the story
had carried for over a century, while maintaining the importance of the event.
The shift in geographical scope of the Westphalia story was largely determined by the
content of the narrative itself. Gross and Morgenthau, unlike their predecessors who wrote on
German history, were writing on the genesis of international relations, and consequently posited
the subject of their inquiry in relevant geographical terms. Similarly, as legal scholars interested
in the attempts made to regulate the anarchic realm of the inter-state system, Gross and Morgenthau
had a profound interest in ‘precedence cases’ of international systems. The shift in narrative focus
caused by the differing interests of the authors thus explained the shift in scope. However, it is
particularly intriguing that Gross and Morgenthau’s narratives omit any impact the treaties may
have had on the Empire, or how the Empire’s altered structure affected the international system;
after all, it was this aspect of the mythos that had dominated previous discourses on Westphalia.
The decision to ignore the treaties’ impact on the Empire, and thus to de-nationalise the story of
Münster and Osnabrück was likely more than merely a stylistic choice. In the wake of the Second
World War, denationalizing the Westphalia narrative was not merely a question of interpretative
semantics, but a conscious political statement. This was a common theme amongst émigré
scholars. German-Jewish historian Fritz Stern explained in his autobiographical work The Five
Germanies I have Known (2006) that he purposely framed his studies on Germany in a European
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context in order to take away the narrative’s dangerous nationalist connotations.99 In the aftermath
of World War I, the power of historical revisionism had been exemplified by the revanchist
‘Dolchstosslegende’ [Stab-in-the-back-myth] of Versailles which had fuelled German nationalism
and militarism in the interwar years, ultimately contributing to Hitler’s rise to power.100 Westphalia
had been the iconic wrong done to the German nation, and the story was therefore a narrative
embodiment of the nationalist mindset. By ending the German ‘monopoly’ on the history of
Westphalia, Gross and Morgenthau consciously undermined German nationalist thinking. The
alternative interpretation they offered, that Westphalia was not a collective injustice or punishment
for the Empire but marked in fact the origins of an international community based on equity and
the equality of states, changed the meaning of the treaties abruptly. It challenged the notion of
Germany as a uniquely mistreated nation and questioned the underlying historical assumptions
upon which German nationalist doctrine had rested ever since Woltmann’s writings.

The Road to War
Any inquiry into the evolution of the historical perspective on the Westphalia Mythos must
begin by examining representations of the origins of the Thirty Years War. Nationalist
historiography asserted that the war of 1618 was the work of three culprits: the ‘Austrian’ Emperor
Ferdinand II, the Catholic Church led by Pope Urban VIII, and the King of France Louis XIII,
along with his chief advisors Cardinal Richelieu and Cardinal Mazarin. Blinded by their ambition
and desire for total power and control over Germany, they burned an entire continent to ashes. Not
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every aspect of this oversimplified interpretation was discarded by Gross and Morgenthau.
However, rather than focusing on the individual culprits of the conflict, they framed the road to
war in more conceptual terms, as ideological fervour in the form of religious intolerance.
Leo Gross described the Westphalian treaties as the end of the medieval world, which he
defined as “a Christian commonwealth […] governed in the spiritual and temporal realms by the
Pope and Emperor”.101 When across Europe, but predominantly the Empire, uprisings “against the
universalistic claims of both Emperor and Pope was on foot”, the “combined impact of these
centrifugal forces could not, in the long run, be resisted solely by the writings of the defenders of
their authority”, resulting in a military crack-down by the Emperor.102 Assessing the cataclysmic
forces responsible for this, Gross concluded that “the Thirty Years War had its origin […] in
religious intolerance”.103 After thirty years of unimaginable destruction, Europe “threw off the
external shackles of Pope and Emperor” by concluding a peace treaty that a “consecrated the
principle of toleration by establishing the equality between Protestants and Catholic states and by
providing some safeguards for religious minorities”, and “affirmed the existence of an autonomous
system of rules of law distinct from the precepts of religion”.104
Hans Morgenthau mirrored Gross’ interpretation of the political situation prior to 1648.
However, even more so than Gross, Morgenthau framed the origins of the War in thematic terms
and shied away from individualizing blame. He argued that on the eve of the Thirty Years War,
Europe was a continent that had been immensely destabilized by the Reformation and the zealous
nature of its religious leaders. The desire of several rulers to “impose [their] religion as the only
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true one upon the rest of the world” resulted in catastrophe.105 It took “a century of almost
unprecedented bloodshed, devastation, and barbarization […] to convince the contestants that the
two religions could live in peace”.106 The peace conferences of Münster and Osnabrück that were
called to end the fighting thus faced the challenge of bringing about a fundamental shift in world
view, one in which the ‘other’ was not only accepted and tolerated, but given inviolable rights
rather than be threatened with annihilation. Harmony then returned to Europe after “the Treaty of
Westphalia brought the religious wars to an end and made the territorial state the cornerstone of
the modern state system”.107 Commenting on the overarching historical trend of the seventeenth
century, Morgenthau concluded that the treaties of 1648 had created a “framework of shared
beliefs and common values, which imposes effective limitations upon ends and means of their
struggle of power”, in opposition to the previous system which had been marked by fundamental
differences in beliefs, varying sets of values, and a lack of effective control of violence.108 The
treaty thus represented the victory of political rationalism over ideological zeal as the foundation
of international relations. To both Gross and Morgenthau, Westphalia was ultimately as much a
religious peace as it was a political settlement. The Thirty Years War, the culmination of religious
intolerance, came to an end through a settlement enshrining religious freedom and secularizing
politics as well as relations between states. However, while religion was thus effectively removed
from the political realm, Gross and Morgenthau were worried that other ideologies could take its
place and polarize the international system once again.
Morgenthau and Gross saw clear parallels between Christian denominations in the
seventeenth century and the ‘secular religion’ of the twentieth century, nationalism. By the late
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1940s the memory of the destructive nature of nationalist fervour was still fresh. Similarly, the
fault lines of the Cold War were drawn along ideological lines, capitalism and democracy versus
communism and dictatorship, instead of geopolitical reasoning. US foreign policy had been
structured to ‘contain’ the spread of communism. Meanwhile it was feared that Joseph Stalin was
eager to bring communism to all corners of the earth, and not without just cause.109 By spring 1948
the demise of the Republic of China at the hands of Mao was all but inevitable, making the spectre
of a global ideological showdown a probable event.110 It was in an attempt to make sense of this
new reality of international relations that Gross and Morgenthau turned to the seventeenth century.
To Hans Morgenthau, the political problems of the past had direct and immediate relevance
in the present. He argued that “as the religious wars of the latter sixteenth and of the first half of
the seventeenth century were followed by the dynastic wars of the latter seventeenth and eighteenth
century, and as the latter yielded to the national wars of the nineteenth century and early twentieth
centuries, so war in our time tends to revert to the religious type by becoming ideological in
character”.111 This assertion was for Morgenthau no mere figure of speech. In fact, he made this
argument in several of his other works. For example, in The Origins of the Cold War (1970) he
reiterated this point arguing that the ideological convictions of communism “transformed an
impasse between national states into a religious war”.112 He also observed that ideological zeal had
again taken hold of the international system as “Foreign policies transformed themselves into
sacred missions. Wars were fought as crusades, for the purpose of bringing the true political
religion to the rest of the world”.113 Morgenthau was clearly making an argument about the dangers
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of ideological zeal, likening “communism, fascism, and Nazism, as well as Japanese Imperialism”
to the religious fervour of the seventeenth century. 114
Leo Gross, as a legal scholar more than a political theorist, made less overt claims; yet his
emphasis on the ideologically intolerant attitudes of European populations in the seventeenth
century suggests that his interpretation was also motivated by his contemporary fears. He had
argued that the Thirty Years War had been the product of “religious intolerance” and, summarizing
the course of the modern state system, had concluded that over the course of the centuries “[T]he
ideological conflict has lost little of its virulence, and periods of ‘thaw’ and ‘freeze’ have
altered”.115 To Gross, the international system had not given up its ideologically-charged character;
religion had merely been replaced by more materialistic ideologies. He argued that the forces that
had driven Europe to war in 1648 had evidently disappeared temporarily only to return, a process
that could repeat itself at any moment. He feared that the world around him, so ideologically
entrenched with each side viewing the other as supreme evil, was as “incapable of dealing with
the ideological conflicts, the clash of different and hostile social, economic, and political systems,
and the rival claims of haves and the have-nots”, as the League of Nations had previously been.116
Much like Morgenthau, Gross perceived and presented the period prior to the Thirty Years War as
a parallel to his current times.
The subsequent interpretation of the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück as creating
permanent peace settlements, resolving ideological issues were clearly influenced by the political
advice Gross and Morgenthau wished to impart to their audience. Hans Morgenthau and Leo Gross
were not rigid ideologues, rather their writings were dedicated to examining the realm of
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international relations and international law with the desire to find a way to stabilize the
increasingly fragile post-Second World War order and avoid another conflict.117 By presenting the
Thirty Years War as a creation of general ideological zeal, rather than the product of any group or
a single actor, Gross and Morgenthau provided a warning to their contemporaries. Belief in the
superiority of one’s principles and values, and the desire to base foreign policy on the will to
universally impose these values, had brought war and terror of unimaginable magnitude in the
past; therefore, it could just as easily happen again. Whatever the aspirations, ambitions, attitudes,
or plans of Emperor, Pope, Princes, and Kings may have been, they were ultimately unable to
prevent war from breaking out. The message Gross and Morgenthau no-to-subtly wished to convey
to their American readers was that ultimately neither they nor their Soviet counterparts would be
able to avoid war once the forces of ‘political religions’ were set in motion. However, more so
than just issuing a warning, Gross and Morgenthau actively advocated for a solution to this
dilemma; after all, “the attempt to impose one’s own religion as the only true one upon the rest of
the world is as futile as it is costly”.118 The interpretation of the Westphalian treaties as
fundamentally changing the nature of foreign politics is more than a subtle hint about what had to
be done in Cold War international relations. The narrative shift on the origins of the Thirty Years
War was therefore rooted in Gross’ and Morgenthau’s present realities and reflects their response
to the political anxieties they faced.
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From the Westphalian Imposition to a Philosopher’s Congress
German nationalist historiography was marked by a high degree of Francophobia; the
narrative on the Westphalian treaties was no different. In their eyes, French diplomats at Münster
coerced the Empire into accepting terms leading to its political debilitation and the transfer of some
of its westernmost provinces to the house of Bourbon. And at Osnabrück it was Sweden, France’s
northern pawn, that took advantage of a ravaged Empire. Within this narrative, the Empire
remained passive while France took the active role of determining the post-war order. Leo Gross
and Hans Morgenthau departed drastically from this plot. At no point did they suggest that the
settlements of 1648 were the product of cold-blooded political opportunism by the King of France;
instead, they argued that the treaties were the political manifestation of both a changing
geopolitical reality and a changing worldview.
Gross’ study of the Westphalian treaties departs fundamentally from preceding narratives
insofar that he paid little attention to the individual clauses of the treaty or its immediate impact
on the political status of Europe. He acknowledged that the decentralization of Imperial power
weakened the Emperor, but emphasised that “the Peace merely finally sealed an existing state of
affairs”.119 He argued that “of even greater importance than these particular aspects of
developments of the Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster were the general political ideas” that were
enunciated there.120 Such ideas had already been developed by Renaissance thinkers who had
foreseen the dangers of universalism and denounced it in favour of a pluralist system of states,
held in equilibrium through a carefully calibrated balance of power.121 He argued that, while the
intellectual and theoretical framework had “evolved prior to 1648, the peace of Westphalia first
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illustrates its application on a grand scale”.122 The narrative about the iconic treaties thus shifted
away from viewing them as a French imposition to regarding them as the manifestation of a new
political understanding, the universal acceptance of political pluralism. For Gross, sixteenthcentury political philosophers such as Francisco de Victoria, Alberico Gentili, Francisco Suarez,
and Jean Bodin, had pioneered this theory and, ultimately, had provided the intellectual impetus
for Westphalia.123 The settlements of Münster and Osnabrück are thus reframed as a congress of
diplomats who consciously applied the doctrines of Europe’s leading political theorists to create a
new world order that would yield a lasting peace.
Hans Morgenthau’s narrative closely mirrored Gross’ on the question of what the
Westphalian treaties constituted. Remarkably, he paid no attention to the immediate political
concerns of the warring parties. The historical context of the ongoing Bourbon-Habsburg feud is
thus entirely omitted. Instead, Morgenthau emphasised the philosophical context of Westphalia
pointing out that “Hugo Grotius’ On the Law of War and Peace, published in 1628, is the classic
codification of that early system of international law” which was subsequently “securely
established in 1648”.124 The treaties are thus effectively reframed as documents produced after
careful discussion of a political theory and as a result of rational thought; this is an enormous
departure from the nationalist interpretation that had presented emotions of vengeance and deceit
as the guiding forces at Münster and Osnabrück. Discussing the legacy of Grotius more broadly,
Morgenthau stipulated that he had shaped seventeenth-century discourses on war, diplomacy, state
power and state relations; all aspects which would come to subsequently form part of what
Morgenthau called the ‘international system’.125 Like Gross, Morgenthau abandoned the idea that
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the Westphalian treaties were a political imposition and insisted on consensus and the conscious
restructuring of international affairs based on established political philosophy.
The Westphalian Treaties were signed by kings, princes, and a range of other ruling
aristocrats who were mostly motivated by very mundane goals. Yet this aspect is missing from
Gross’ and Morgenthau’s narrative. In fact, they ignore the individual parties involved. The
narrative thus evolves from a story about personal and political rivalry into a story about the
conscious reform of the international system. The absence of excessive criticism of France is no
surprise either. Gross and Morgenthau, unlike German nationalists, were not preoccupied with
casting France as the villain, the arch-enemy of the German nation, or a danger to international
peace. Conceived in the aftermath of two world wars and shortly after the founding of the United
Nations, a time in which the international system was once again facing serious challenges, Gross
and Morgenthau’s representation of the past was undoubtedly guided by their present concerns
and realities. The emphasis on the political ideals that were supposedly manifested at Westphalia
closely paralleled the political context within which they were writing. The ‘universalist’ attitudes
of Pope and Holy Roman Emperor, called to a halt by the diplomats at Westphalia, who had all
apparently carefully read their Grotius, mirrored both Hitler’s and Stalin’s ambitions.126 The
lessons of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles had taught Europeans that weakening a defeated power
was no guarantee for a lasting peace; and neither would appeasement through territorial
concessions.127 The road to peace and stability thus did not lie in territorial concessions to the
defeated, but rather in the conscious reform of the international system based on a set of accepted
principles that were outside the ideological forces at war with one another.
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The mid twentieth-century transformation of the Westphalian narrative was therefore
motivated by a desire to find a historical precedent in which a reform of the international system
had yielded the desired outcome. By that point, seventeenth-century European geopolitics had
become obsolete and meaningless. The preeminent danger to European stability, the enduring
Franco-German rivalry that had dominated four hundred years of the continent’s political history,
had finally been solved.128 However, what remained of interest to scholars was the underlying
ideological change that had transformed European international relations and produced a
considerable degree of political stability. The acute insistence on the fact that the ideals enshrined
at Westphalia were those of the day’s leading political, philosophical, and legal theorists, was to
some degree self-advertisement on the part of modern political scholars. After all, both Gross and
Morgenthau, themselves among the leading legal and political thinkers of their day, were not
merely writing for an academic audience but also sought to influence policy decisions. By
highlighting the impact Grotius and Bodin had on the Westphalian treaties, but neglecting to
mention Johan Salvius, the chief negotiator of queen Christina of Sweden, or any other diplomats
for that matter, Gross and Morgenthau were making a statement on who, in their eyes, the actual
architects of peace and stability were. 129 This becomes even more apparent when examining the
political ideals and values highlighted in their narratives, such as the supremacy of state
sovereignty, ideological pluralism, and the notion of an international system based on existing
power relations rather than ideology, which Gross and Morgenthau shared with the thinkers they
argued provided the intellectual impetus for the Westphalian settlements.130
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The Westphalian Legacy: Chaos vs Order and International Law
Early Modern Europe was constantly at war. Civil war, religious strife, imperialist
ambitions, or the simple opportunism of princes ensured that on some part of the continent fighting
ensued.131 Of the many wars that were fought, and the many treaties that were signed to end them,
none have been given the level of attention that the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück have been
awarded. The Westphalian treaties achieved their iconic status through narratives emphasising
their legacy beyond merely ending the Thirty Years War. Within nineteenth-century German
historiography the legacy of the Westphalian settlements was one of destruction. The Empire had
been rendered obsolete as a political unit; unable to expand or properly defend itself, it was a mere
corpse of a state that routinely fell prey to its enemies. Ranke in particular insisted that the
Westphalian treaties did not have a stabilizing effect on Europe. Rather the weakness of the Empire
served as the basis for subsequent wars and continued conflicts. Gross and Morgenthau’s
interpretation of the legacy of the Westphalian treaties is markedly different. Both authors argue
that 1648 actually marked the beginning of an international framework centred around
international law that ushered in a century of peace and stability.
In the opening pages of his article examining the Westphalian settlements, Leo Gross
argued that their defining legacy was that they presented a serious attempt to create some degree
of “world unity on the basis of states exercising untrammelled sovereignty over certain territories
and subordinated to no earthly authority”.132 Its framework represented “the starting point for the
development of international law” and “thereby established a precedent of far reaching
importance.”133 In fact, he contended that all significant international treaties in the subsequent
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three centuries built on 1648. Gross argued that the constitution of the Germanic confederation in
1815, the treaty of Vienna in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars also in 1815, the Congress of
Berlin in 1878, and the creation of Poland after the First World War all adhered to and echoed the
principles articulated in the Westphalian settlements, merely continuing the line of political
thinking established there rather than presenting any drastic innovation.134 While the treaties of
Münster and Osnabrück did not bring about world peace, the legal aspects of the treaties brought
a certain degree of stability and security to Europe by providing “provisions for a moratorium of
war, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and for individual and collective sanctions
against the aggressor”.135 The interpretation of the political status in post-1648 Europe thus shifted
from chaos on account of political pluralism to order through international law. Although such a
conclusion may seem quite natural for a legal scholar, it was a tough position to argue in 1948
given the most recent failures of international law to uphold peace.
This narrative pivot outlined in Gross’ writings can also be observed in Morgenthau’s study
of the Westphalian treaties. Much like Gross, he argued that the “rules of international law laying
down the rights and duties of states in relation to each other […] were securely established in
1648”.136 This feat was accomplished by binding together the states of Europe within a “framework
of shared beliefs and common values”.137 The new system in which the international order was
maintained by the shared principles of international law lasted “from the Treaty of Westphalia to
the Napoleonic Wars and then again from the end of the latter to the First World War”.138 Assessing
the impact the creation of an international system based on law had on Europe, Morgenthau
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concluded that during the “years of its existence international law has in most instances been
scrupulously observed”.139 The period following the Thirty Years War was thus one not marked
by chaos, but one in which states accepted both limitations on their power and the rights of other
states to exist, regardless of ideological or religious differences. The legacy of the Westphalian
settlements in Morgenthau’s interpretation is thus, much like Gross’ reading, diametrically
opposed to what German historians had been arguing for previous decades.
The origins of this evolution of the Westphalian Mythos lies again in the changing context
within which each narrative was created. Nineteenth-century German historians were writing from
a nationalist point of view; the narrative they constructed centred on the German state and its
political predecessors. The political pluralism that emerged after 1648 was thus seen as the origin
point for any subsequent conflicts that befell the Empire. Gross and Morgenthau were not writing
from a primarily German perspective at all, but rather from a cosmopolitan one. In fact, by 1948
both were US citizens and certainly did not wish to return to Europe. Having directly and
personally suffered from the Nazi regime, neither of them felt any sense of belonging to a German
state.140 Furthermore, the subject of their interest was not the future German state or the Holy
Roman Empire, but the international system of early modern Europe with a particular emphasis
on its legal aspects. The reflection that Westphalia ushered in a period of stability was thus not a
commentary on the state of the Holy Roman Empire, but the framework of international affairs
which guided the actions of state actors. The political context of the post-war period certainly
played a role in shaping this reading of the Westphalian settlements. Implicitly, Gross and
Morgenthau were directing the attention of their readership to the importance of systemic change
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in order to create stability. Pressing issues such as the post-war integration of a new German state
into the international system, the gradual dismantlement of the remaining European empires, and
the possible confrontation of Soviet and American interests, dominated Cold War discourses.141
Avoiding the escalation of peripheral strife into total war required an established framework of
international affairs. The narrative of the legacy of the Westphalian treaties thus evolved and
revolved specifically around the lessons its authors wished to draw and the purpose they could
serve in the present. Given the multitude of scopes from which these lessons could be drawn, the
narrative was able to shift drastically and move into a diametrically opposite direction.
The emphasis on the creation of International Law at the 1648 settlements within the
political science narrative raises one more question. Why did Gross and Morgenthau stress that it
was ‘law’ that was created? Westphalia yielded no international court, nor did any signatories
pledge themselves to adhere to a certain code of conduct; at best, it provided the Empire with a
new internal framework.142 In fact, seventeenth-century scholars certainly did not perceive the
1648 treaties as having created some sort of legal system governing interstate relations. The
Empire’s leading legal scholar and philosopher during the late seventeenth century, Samuel
Freiherr von Pufendorf, argued in his magnum opus On the Law of Nature and Nations (1672),
that in the current system of states there was no positive, that is man-made, international law
amongst nations.143 Rather, Pufendorf claimed, states interacted with one another based on the
eternal moral principles of the law of nations that were dictated by reason alone and not created
by an assembly or a treaty.144 Gross and Morgenthau were thus openly contradicting well- known
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previous scholarship without providing any real argument why the previously held belief should
be rejected and their position adopted. They were consciously making an argument that would be
difficult to defend intellectually, when they could have simply argued that, following the
Westphalian treaties, states acknowledged certain rules. That argument would have been more
easily maintained. Again, the period within which Gross and Morgenthau were writing, as well as
their disciplinary background as legal scholars, provide guidance into the possible motivation of
the authors. In the wake of the Nuremburg trials (1945-1946) and the creation of the United
Nations, international law experienced a renaissance.145 Gross and Morgenthau had some
reservations about the ability of international law to serve as the sole guardian of peace and
stability, but certainly were adamant advocates of law as an integral component of the international
system.146 However, memory of the League of Nation’s inability to enforce its legal framework
when confronted with hard power, and the failures of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) to provide a
legal solution to end armed conflict, had emboldened critics of international law and created the
perception that it would be utterly ineffective. 147 By arguing that Westphalia had stabilized Europe
after the destruction of the Thirty Years War through the application of international law, Gross
and Morgenthau made the case for international law as the backbone of the emerging post-war era.
By rooting the origin of international law within these treaties, and showing their legacy unfold
over the subsequent three hundred years, Gross and Morgenthau provided international law with
a genesis story and a genealogy. The evolution of the Westphalian Mythos reveals then that
narratives not only evolve depending on the changing context authors write in, but are also
influenced by the points they want to make about the times they are writing in and the message
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they want to convey. In this case study, these forces of historiographical creation have transformed
the historical perspective of the story of Westphalia from a nationalist tale of a historic wrong to a
story on the origins of modern international relations. However, the myth of 1648 did not evolve
only through a shift in historical perspective; it also saw a dramatic change in the narrative voice
and a transformation in the underlying message the narrative aimed to impart on its audience.

From a ‘National Catastrophe’ to the ‘Majestic Portal’: A Change in Narrative Voice
Scholars have ignored the rapidly changing attitude of writers on Westphalia, even though
this is a most significant and overt transformation. The treaties of Münster and Osnabrück stand
proxy for injustice and treachery in nineteenth-century literature and are denounced as the source
of all subsequent ills that befell the German nation. As previously discussed, German historians
used powerful language to underline the emotional resentment they felt towards these treaties.
Treitschke argued that the Empire, post-Westphalia, was “smashed into pieces” [Trümmerstücke];
Ranke opted for the “rape” [Vergewaltigung] of Germany; and Holzwarth saw in them the political
embodiment of the Anti-Christ, just to recall the most vivid descriptions.148 This fundamentally
negative attitude with which nationalist historians engaged with the topic they studied gave way
to the calm admiration with which political scientists looked upon the treaties.
The positive connotations Morgenthau associated with them is hard to miss. He argued that
“if there was to be at least a certain measure of peace and order in relation among such entities
[states] […] there must be certain rules of conduct defined beforehand”; fortunately, “these rules
of international law were securely established in 1648”.149 Elsewhere, he noted that to

148

Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte im 19ten Jahrhundert, 6-7; Ranke, Französische Geschichte, 462; Holzwarth,
Weltgeschichte, 2. Translations by the author.
149
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 210.

42

contemporaries the ‘new’ modern and sovereign state “could not be explained by the medieval
theory of the state. The doctrine of sovereignty elevated them into a legal theory and thus gave
them […] moral approbation”.150 It is evident that Morgenthau was sympathetic to the legacy of
the Westphalian treaties. Gross’ writings reveal a little more about his emotional relation to the
historical event. He described the treaties as “the majestic portal which leads from the old world
into the new”. For him, the old “medieval world was characterized by a hierarchical conception of
the relationship between the existing political entities on the one hand, and the Emperor on the
other”. Meanwhile, the new one was defined by “the notion that all states form a world-wide
political system” which “rests on international law and the balance of power”.151
The shifts within the characterization of Westphalia create a shift in narrative
consciousness that can be explained through Morgenthau’s and Gross’ personal experiences prior
and during the Second World War. Neither reveal any particularly anti-German sentiments, a fact
that has not escaped scholars such as William Scheuerman and Alison McQueen. 152 However, a
fractured, politically disabled Germany struck both authors, like many contemporaries, as the
preferred alternative.153 They acknowledged the decentralization of the Empire’s power structure
following Westphalia, yet focused on the positive development this had in the seventeenth and
eighteenth century, particularly in regards to religious liberties and political pluralism.154 The
enthusiastic optimism that Gross’ and Morgenthau’s accounts associate with the 1648 treaties did
not merely represent changing attitudes about German nationalism. After all, nationalist stories
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had fuelled nationalist sentiments as much as they had been sustained by them. By changing the
narrative consciousness, Gross and Morgenthau were taking ownership of the narrative away from
nationalists. Westphalia remained iconic within collective memory after the Second World War,
not for spelling Germany’s doom and demise, but rather for marking the genesis of peace and order
in war-torn Europe. This process was amplified through the specific language Gross and
Morgenthau used. Introducing the notion of Westphalia as marking the beginning of ‘sovereign
equality’ and ‘balance of power’ turned the treaties into symbols of nation-to-nation
egalitarianism, with no concrete winner and no direct loser. This underlying transformation was
so powerful that by the 1970s the term ‘Westphalian’ had become synonymous with an
understanding of inter-state egalitarianism.155
This example is the most obvious change in the Westphalian mythos and the root cause of
this development is almost self-explanatory. However, precisely because of its self-evident nature,
it illuminates the ease with which authors are able to appropriate existing narratives and reinterpret
certain aspects of the story to fit contemporary needs and reflect a new political consensus. As
Andrew Norman has argued, the depiction of the past within a story is always relative to the
context; however, what the example of Westphalia demonstrates is that the emotional undertones
that infuse a narrative with a consciousness can change and transform its meaning, even if the
underlying historical assumption, in this case the decentralization of power within the Empire,
remains static.156 The emotions associated with a past event that are carried, amplified, and
perpetuated by a historical narrative have as decisive of an impact on shaping our perception of
the past as does the story itself. The evolution of the Westphalian Mythos, that morphed from a
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story about national shame into a tale of stability, tolerance, and the beginning of international law
and a community of states, demonstrates that interpretations about the past are not set in stone,
passed on unchanged from one generation of scholars to the next, but are fluid and can be subject
to rapid change.
However, not all aspects of the evolution of the Westphalia story were a direct response to
previous narratives. In fact, the realities of 1948 guided the changes in the narrative as much as
Gross and Morgenthau’s past had. It is common for political historians to illuminate parallels
between past and present. After all, nineteenth-century German historians were seemingly
exclusively motivated by current geopolitics. Likewise, Gross’ and Morgenthau’s depiction of the
Westphalian Treaties and Europe following the Thirty Years War matches that of the world in
1948 exceptionally closely. Ironically then, both sets of authors were making an underlying
ideological argument that directly related to their immediate present, yet as the context within
which the narratives changed so did their underlying ideological foundations. The nationalist tale
of Westphalia was a call to action, to right a historic wrong and to expose and expel the French
from Germany’s lands once and for all. The underlying ideological message of Leo Gross and
Hans Morgenthau could not be more different. Theirs is a story of continuity, calm, and
acknowledgement of the positive outcomes of Westphalia. As explained previously, Gross and
Morgenthau were early proponents of Realist theory in international relations. Rather than provide
a history of the Peace of Westphalia or provide an in-depth study of the history of international
relations throughout the previous centuries, they used the story of Westphalia to demonstrate that
the principles articulated in Realist political thought had in fact already governed the course of
international relations for the past three centuries. This, of course, could only be accomplished by
emphasising the parallels between 1648 and 1948, as well as the role of Westphalia in shaping
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everything that happened in between. For example, when Gross and Morgenthau argued that the
legacy of the Westphalian treaties was maintained by a balance of power, they were providing a
historical example when that principle had created peace in the past and could ultimately preserve
it in the present.157 The narrative of Westphalia thus evolved from a historical study into a case
study exemplifying realist political theory. Hence, the underlying message is not that Westphalia
had to be undone, like the nationalists had suggested, but on the contrary that it had to be upheld
and improved upon in order to bring peace and stability to the post-war world.

The Death of a Narrative and the Survival of Another
As Joachim Whaley has pointed out, German historians writing in the immediate aftermath
of the Second World War carefully avoided the Westphalian treaties, lest they stir up the emotions
of the nation like Treitschke and Woltmann had.158 It was not until the 1970s that German
historians carefully reassessed the legacy 1648 with the ultimate goal to prove that it was not the
watershed moment in the Empire’s history that previous generations of scholars had made it out
to be. However, Gross and Morgenthau were writing in the United States; their audience was
largely removed from previous discourses on Westphalia and thus a blank slate with no
preconceived notion of the event. The fact that the Westphalian treaties maintained their iconic
status throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century in Anglo-Saxon political science
scholarship thus owes much to the fact that Gross and Morgenthau changed the meaning of
Westphalia and were writing at an opportune time. As Sebastian Schmid has pointed out, it was in
large part thanks to them that by the 1970s the term ‘Westphalian system’ had become a terminus
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technicus within the political science discipline which, as Stephan Krasner laments, still
prevails.159 Furthermore, Gross and Morgenthau were authorities in their fields and their works
quickly became standard, classic texts, attracting a vast readership among politicians, academics,
as well as laymen. Moreover, academic overspecialization and disciplinary fracturing drove a
wedge between the work of political scientists and historians, allowing Gross and Morgenthau’s
representations of the Westphalian treaties to virtually monopolize scholarly and public discourse
on the subject. Their writings served as the foundation for any subsequent literature on Westphalia
and are still widely cited until this day. 160
The evolution of the Westphalia Myth in political science illustrates that post-war politics
not only shaped Gross’ and Morgenthau’s interpretation and depiction of the past, but also helped
perpetuate their narrative and marginalize alternative readings of the past. Their narrative thus did
not necessarily prevail and dominate discourses on the 1648 settlements because it offered
something fundamentally new or approached the topic from a vastly novel angle, but because it
corresponded to and was perfectly aligned with the post-war mindset and world view. Reflecting
on the evolution of historical narratives in general terms, this case study indicates that scholars
must not only consider the impact of historical context on historiographical creations, but also the
role of historical context in creating a hierarchy amongst narratives. Competing interpretations of
a historical event are thus maintained, or forgotten, depending on their ability to serve the present
political ideals of the reader. Similarly, narratives transform and evolve in order to remain relevant
or to draw a new lesson from a well-known historical story. As present realities fluctuate and create
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new needs, fears, and anxieties, new narratives about the past emerge and evolve to address these
issues.

Conclusions
Considering the acute variation between academic narratives about the 1648 treaties, a
revision of the contemporary conceptualizations of the Westphalian Mythos is in order. Rather
than dealing with one single myth that originated in nineteenth-century German historiography
and was adapted by and evolved within twentieth-century political science, scholars are in fact
dealing with a second myth. The political science narrative of the treaties of Münster and
Osnabrück began when Leo Gross and Hans Morgenthau examined the Westphalian treaties and
used their interpretation as a genesis story for mid-twentieth-century foreign political realism. If
the historical framework of the Westphalia story was maintained, Ranke and Woltmann like Gross
and Morgenthau argued that the 1648 treaties devolved key powers from the Emperor to the
Empire’s princes, but the unique historical perspective, narrative consciousness, and underlying
ideological assumptions tied to the story, fundamentally shifted after the Second World War.
No author of history can ever see the past clearly, in fact they cannot have access to it.
Rather, the past is perceived through a kaleidoscope, which creates a unique depiction of what it
seeks to represent; like the toy, the depiction of the historical story shifts, evolves, and transforms
with every turn. The ‘mirrors, lenses, and glass shards’ of this historiographic kaleidoscope that
have created and transformed the Westphalian mythos in the nineteenth and twentieth century are
the political context, academic and disciplinary trends, intellectual debates, as well as personal and
professional experiences of scholars. No single factor creates or transforms a historical story;
rather, all of these combined, shape how authors perceive and represent the past, at times
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independently from and in contradistinction to previous versions of the same story. Leo Gross and
Hans Morgenthau’s version of history in “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948” and Politics
Among Nations are thus ultimately not only a depiction of the past, but even more so a reflection
of their perception of the world in their own times.
This case study ultimately reveals the power of historical context within academic creation
and the need to recognize narrative discrepancies. The unique relationship of a scholar to his or
her own past thus inevitably gets lost if we merely chart the evolution of an idea, side-lining those
who created it and in what context they wrote their narratives. Stories about the past are in constant
flux and perpetual evolution. However, these changes do not come about by rejecting or favouring
one interpretation over another. Rather, our understanding of the past changes according to the
emphasis scholars place on certain aspects of a complex picture. This process by which authors
either consciously or subconsciously diverge and change the historical perspective of a story is
determined by the context within which they are writing. Tales of the past then do not survive or
die by the assessment of their historical accuracy, but by the meaning ascribed to them and the
relevance they have for their readership. Contextual forces not only produce new interpretations,
they also serve as a lens through which past narratives are perceived. The emerging hierarchy
amongst historiographical texts ultimately determines which story prevails or holds precedence in
our memory of an event or person. Intriguingly, the most pronounced shift in a narrative can occur
not by what is being said, but by how and why something is being said. For Leo Gross and Hans
Morgenthau, taking ownership of the Westphalian myth that had been dominated by nationalist
discourses was a political statement. The relationship between historical context and
historiographical creation should therefore not be viewed like the ‘invisible hand’ that acts like an
inanimate force changing our understanding of the past. Rather, the historical context serves as the
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setting and provides the rationale within which authors consciously construct their narratives to
make a statement about their present times.
Beyond illustrating the power of historical context in historiographical creation, this case
study has illuminated the danger of trying to essentialize and theorize political history. As Henry
Kissinger put it, “history is not a cookbook offering pretested recipes”.161 Scholars who are
determined to distil a theory of human or state behaviour out of history will find an answer, but
one that is certainly biased and flawed and which misconstrues the past. Following a wave of
extended historical research into the legacy of the 1648 treaties following the 350-year anniversary
of their signing in 1998, historians have rejected almost every aspect of Gross and Morgenthau’s
narrative. Westphalia did not mark the beginning of international law, nor found a system of
sovereign states, nor was it the work of scholastic diplomats but simply the product of seventeenthcentury geopolitics.162 Of course, this does not mean that scholars should ignore patterns of human
behaviour or even make history irrelevant for political science. If anything, political science could
benefit from a return to a more historical approach. It encourages us to look at specific events and
see what individual lessons can be drawn from them. After all, attempting to summarize three
hundred years of European political history into a ‘scientific’ theory did not yield any greater
understanding of the past. Ultimately, the resilience of the Westphalian Mythos in political science
should encourage historians to write outside of their discipline as well. The list of authors who
have criticised and challenged the Westphalian Mythos number the hundreds – but only within
historical journals or history books. As academic disciplines continue to fracture and drift apart,
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historians should dare to share their research with other disciplines in order to challenge missconstructed interpretations of the past and engage in the transformation and evolution of historical
narratives on a wider level.
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